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Abstract
Within the context of the neoclassical growth model I investigate the impli-
cations of (initial) endowment inequality when the rich have a higher marginal
savings rate than the poor. More unequal societies grow faster in the transition
process, and therefore exhibit a higher speed of convergence. Furthermore, there
is divergence in consumption and lifetime wealth if the rich exhibit a higher in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Unlike the Solow-Stiglitz model, the steady state is always unique although
the consumption function is concave.
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1 Introduction
Rich people save more. Will inequality necessarily continue to increase over time?
Furthermore, how does this savings behavior affect the growth path? Tackling these
questions is a priori a complex task: Inequality affects capital accumulation when the
marginal propensities to consume (MPC) differ. However, inequality changes through
the accumulation process because savings rates differ and factor prices change. It
is the purpose of this paper to analyze this relationship between inequality and this
savings behavior within the context of the neoclassical growth model with perfect and
complete markets.
Theoretical arguments that consumption propensities decrease with wealth date
back at least to Fisher (1930) and Keynes (1936).1 Carroll and Kimball (1996) show
that when agents are subject to uninsurable risks or liquidity constraints the consump-
tion function is concave except in special cases. The empirical relevance of decreasing
MPC is unquestioned. Looking at household data, it is a well-established fact that
rich people save more - not only on average but also at the margin - out of wealth
or permanent income; see the paper by Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) and their
references.2
What are the macroeconomic effects of decreasing MPC? To make my point as
simple as possible, I perform my analysis under full certainty but where the different
1Fisher and Keynes stated their argument in terms of the saving function. Note that a convex
saving function is equivalent to a concave consumption function. I will state the relevant properties in
terms of the consumption function throughout the paper.
2Perhaps unsurprisingly, the empirical picture is less clear on the aggregate level. The differences
between studies are due to different data sets and different approaches to the endogeneity problems.
Although Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (2000) and Li and Zou (2004) could not find a robust effect of
inequality on saving or consumption, Cook (1995) and Smith (2001) found a positive effect of inequality
on (private) saving rates. The well-known studies of Barro (2000) and Forbes (2000) obtain a positive
inequality growth relationship, at least for rich countries. This is also consistent with the view that
inequality increases savings.
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MPC arise due to non-homothetic preferences. To the best of my knowledge there is
so far no study of inequality and growth under the conditions that consumers behave
optimally and the resulting consumption function is concave. Stiglitz (1969) studies
the dynamics of distribution when consumption is an exogenously given linear function
of wealth. Chatterjee (1994), Caselli and Ventura (2001) and Bertola, Foellmi, and
Zweimueller (2006, Chap. 3) study the same question in a Ramsey model where the
linear consumption rule is a result of dynamic optimization. The impact of concave
consumption functions on the evolution of inequality and growth was previously stud-
ied by Bourguignon (1981) and Schlicht (1975) in the context of the Solow-Stiglitz
model with exogenous consumption propensities. Bourguignon (1981) shows that mul-
tiple steady states may emerge that can be Pareto-ranked. In this paper, a concave
consumption function is the result of a dynamic optimization with intertemporally
separable preferences. Surprisingly, the analysis is greatly simplified: the steady state
equilibrium is unique and independent of the initial distribution. This result implies
that more unequal societies must exhibit a higher speed of convergence because they
grow faster in the transition process.
A related important strand of the literature includes papers by Becker (1980), Lucas
and Stokey (1984) and, more recently, Sorger (2002). They study conditions when the
long run distribution of wealth is non-degenerate in steady state. Furthermore, Bliss
(2004) analyzes a general class of preferences to determine whether convergence occurs
in the accumulation process. However, the focus of these papers is not to analyze the
impact of inequality on growth.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Both the com-
petitive equilibrium and the social planner’s solution are analyzed. Section 3 then
presents a numerical simulation. In the final section, Section 4, the differences from
Bourguignon’s model are discussed.
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2 The model
2.1 Set-up
Preferences All consumers have the same intertemporal additive preferences and
the same discount rate. The time horizon is infinite. Hence, the intertemporal utility
function is given by
Ui =
Z ∞
0
e−ρtu(ci(t))dt (1)
where ci(t) denotes consumption of individual i at date t. We assume that (i) u(·) is
twice continuously differentiable above some (subsistence) level c̄ ≥ 0. (ii) We take
the usual assumption that u0 > 0 > u00, i.e. marginal utility is declining but the
individual is non-satiated (at least over the relevant range). (iii) Further we assume
limc→c̄ u0(c) = ∞ and limc→∞ u0(c) = 0. Assumptions (i) and (ii) imply that the
elasticity of substitution is positive for all c > c̄ :
− u
0(c)
u00(c)c
> 0 for c > c̄ ≥ 0.
Individual factor endowments We assume that - at date 0 - household i is en-
dowed with li units of labor, which is assumed to be constant over time, and ki(0)
units of capital. We restrict the inequality in the way that all households are viable,
i.e., each household can afford to consume more than c̄ in every period of time. We will
come back to this assumption below. The number of households is constant. Hence
total amount of labor L is also constant and we normalize it to one. Hence, the total
amount of labor and capital in the economy is given by
K ≡
Z
N
ki(t)dPi
1 ≡
Z
N
lidPi
where N denotes the set of families and dPi the size of family i.
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Technology and competitive factor rewards The inputs labor and capital are
used to produce a homogenous output good Y which can be both used for consump-
tion and investment. Production takes place with a standard neoclassical production
function F (·, ·) with constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal products. The
production function shall be twice continuously differentiable in its arguments. There
is no technological progress, i.e., we focus on transitional dynamics only.3
Y (t) = F (K(t), 1) ≡ f(K(t))
The factors are rewarded their marginal products, hence the interest rate and the wage
rate are given by
r(t) = f 0(K(t)) (2)
w(t) = f(K(t))−K(t)f 0(K(t))
and are uniquely determined by the current capital stock K(t).
2.2 The social planner’s problem
Before turning to the market equilibrium it is useful to consider the social planner’s
problem. The planner assigns welfare weights ωi to the individuals which are pinned
down by the (initial) distribution of ki and li in the decentralized optimum analyzed
in the next section.4 Setting up the current value Hamiltonian with {ci(t)} as control
and K(t) as state variable
H =
Z
N
ωiu(ci(t))dPi + λ(t)K̇(t)
3As is well known, with positive growth we get steady states only if the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is constant, i.e., utility is CRRA.
4 In a decentralized equilibrium, consumption depends monotonically on lifetime resources - which
in turn are determined by the initial distribution of ki and li . Hence for each distribution of lifetime
resources there is a distribution of welfare weights ωi such as to mimic the decentralized solution.
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subject to the capital accumulation constraint (the output good can be used both for
consumption and investment)
K̇(t) = f(K(t))−
Z
N
ci(t)dPi (3)
leads to the first order conditions
ωiu
0(ci(t))− λ(t) = 0 (4)
and
ρλ(t)− λ̇(t) = λ(t)f 0(K(t)). (5)
We may disregard the Kuhn-Tucker conditions because of the Inada conditions and
the distributional assumptions. The first order conditions (4) and (5) and the capital
accumulation equation (3) give the standard pair of differential equations, we omit
time indices,
λ̇
λ
= ρ− f 0(K) (6)
K̇ = f(K)−
Z
N
c(ωi, λ)dPi
where c(ωi, λ) is implicitly defined by ωiu0(ci) = λ. Figure 1 depicts equations (6)
with K on the horizontal and λ on the vertical axis. The λ̇ = 0 locus is vertical at
f 0(K) = ρ, and the K̇ = 0 locus is monotonically decreasing as c(ωi, λ) is decreasing in
λ. The system has a unique saddle path with negative slope. Hence the policy function
λ(K) is uniquely determined.
Figure 1
2.3 The decentralized equilibrium
Markets are perfect and complete. We assume that each household is able to consume
more than c̄. All individuals face the same factor prices, thus the household’s income
6
is given by w(t)li + r(t)ki(t). The evolution of individual wealth then reads k̇i(t) =
w(t)li+r(t)ki(t)−ci(t). Imposing the transversality condition we get the intertemporal
budget constraint. The utility maximization problem of the consumer reads
max
{ci(t)}
Z ∞
0
e−ρtu(ci(t))dt s.t.
Z ∞
0
e−R(t)ci(t)dt ≤ ki(0) +
Z ∞
0
e−R(t)w(t)lidt
where R(t) =
R t
0 r(s)ds. The first order condition reads
e−ρtu0(ci(t))− μie−R(t) = 0 (7)
where μi denotes the marginal utility of wealth. Our assumptions on the production
function imply that R(t) is differentiable. Hence, we may differentiate (7) with respect
to time and get the familiar Euler equation
ċi(t) = −
u0(ci(t))
u00(ci(t))
(r(t)− ρ) . (8)
It is easy to see that the FOC of the decentralized equilibrium are equivalent to
those of the social planner’s problem. Differentiating (4) with respect to time, we get
ċi = λ̇u
0(ci)/ (λu00(ci)) . Using (6) to replace λ̇/λ, immediately leaves us with the Euler
equation (8). The resource constraint is clearly the same in both cases. Hence, the
decentralized equilibrium is unique and Pareto-efficient.
Aggregating (8) we obtain the equation of motion for aggregate consumption C
Ċ(t) = (r(t)− ρ)
Z
N
− u
0(ci(t))
u00(ci(t))
dPi. (9)
2.3.1 Steady State
Because there is no technical progress, the economy will be in steady state when C, Y,
and K are constant. Setting λ̇ = 0 and K̇ = 0 in (6) yields us the steady state value
of the interest rate and the consumption level
r∗ = f 0(K∗) = ρ
C∗ = f(K∗).
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Hence, the steady state capital stock is unique and independent of the distribution.5
This shows that the macroeconomic analysis of decreasing MPC on the individual level
is much simpler in a model with optimizing agents. Because individual consumption
increases - although the growth rate may differ due to the varying intertemporal rate
of substitution - if the interest rate exceeds the rate of time preference, there must be
a unique stationary steady state. This is a sharp difference to Bourguignon’s (1981)
result. In a model with optimizing agents the macroeconomic analysis of decreasing
MPC on individual level turns out to be much simpler. Since individual consumption
increases - although the growth rate may differ because of the varying intertemporal
rate of substitution - if the interest rate exceeds the rate of time preference, there
must be a unique stationary steady state. For any (separable) utility function (1), it
is optimal to choose a constant consumption flow only if r = ρ.
2.3.2 Transitional dynamics
Although distribution does not affect the steady state, the transitional dynamics are
affected when the consumption function is non-linear. The following Lemmas 1-4
describe the properties of the consumption ci(t) as a function of wealth ai(t), for a
given path of interest rates.
Lemma 1 Iff ci(0) > cj(0), then ci(t) ≥ cj(t) ∀t.
Proof. The first order condition (7) may be rewritten u0(ci(t)) = e−R(t)+ρtu0(ci(0)).
This implies that ci(t) is monotonic in ci(0).
Lemma 2 Individual consumption is monotonically increasing in wealth ki(0)+
R∞
0 e
−R(t)w(t)lidt.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that a poorer agent’s consumption today is higher
than that of a richer agent. Lemma 1 implies that the poor’s consumption will not be
5Although the aggregate values of K and C are unique, the individual ci− and ki−distribution is
indeterminate and is governed by the initial distribution (see Sorger, 2002).
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lower than of the rich in the future. As the rich agent’s intertemporal budget constraint
is satisfied with equality, the poor would violate his budget constraint.
To proceed, it is useful to define φ(x) ≡ −u0(x)/u00(x).
Lemma 3 If φ(.) is convex and ci(t) > ci(0), then ci(t) is a convex function of ci(0).
Proof. We use u0(ci(t)) = e−R(t)+ρtu0(ci(0)). Differentiate this equation with
respect to ci(t) and ci(0) to get
∂ci(t)
∂ci(0)
=
φ(ci(t))
φ(ci(0))
.
where we replaced e−R(t)+ρt by u0(ci(t))/u0(ci(0)).To determine d2c(t)/dci(0)2, we take
the derivative with respect to ci(0)
∂2ci(t)
∂ci(0)2
=
φ0(ci(t))
φ(ci(t))
φ(ci(0))
φ(ci(0))− φ(ci(t))φ0(ci(0))
[φ(ci(0))]
2
=
φ(ci(t))
[φ(ci(0))]
2
£
φ0(ci(t))− φ0(ci(0))
¤
.
Hence, ∂2ci(t)/∂ci(0)2 > 0 iff φ0(ci(t)) > φ0(ci(0)). This holds true if φ(.) is convex and
ci(t) > ci(0).
Lemma 4 If φ(.) is convex and ci(t) > ci(0), consumption is a concave function of
wealth.
Proof. Define ai(0) ≡ ki(0)+
R∞
0 e
−R(t)w(t)lidt.We differentiate the intertemporal
budget with respect to wealth and get
∂ci(0)
∂ai(0)
=
∙Z ∞
0
e−R(t)
∂ci(t)
∂ci(0)
dt
¸−1
∂2ci(0)
∂ai(0)2
= −
∙Z ∞
0
e−R(t)
∂ci(t)
∂ci(0)
dt
¸−2 Z ∞
0
e−R(t)
∂2ci(t)
∂ci(0)2
∂ci(0)
∂ai(0)
dt
= −
µ
∂ci(0)
∂ai(0)
¶3 Z ∞
0
e−R(t)
∂2ci(t)
∂ci(0)2
dt.
By Lemma 3, ∂2ci(t)/∂ci(0)2 > 0, this implies ∂2ci(0)/∂ai(0)2 < 0.
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For a given path of interests and wages, Lemma 4 gives the condition such that the
rich have a lower marginal consumption propensity than the poor. If φ(.) is convex
and the economy is growing (such that ci(t) > ci(0)), aggregate savings are higher in
a more unequal society when the conditions in Lemma 4 hold.
Let us now consider two economies that are identical except for the fact that the
second economy’s wealth distribution is generated from the first economy’s wealth
distribution via a mean-preserving spread. The following Proposition 1 states that the
second economy exhibits a higher saving rate and grows faster.
Proposition 1 If −u0(c)/u00(c) is convex and the economy is growing, more unequal
societies (aggregate wealth held constant) have a higher savings rate and a higher rate
of output growth.
Proof. According to Lemma 4, a regressive transfer in wealth decreases aggregate
consumption for a given path interests and wages because the consumption function is
concave with −u0(c)/u00(c) is convex. However, to determine the impact on aggregate
consumption, we must take into account the change in the path of factor prices.
To tackle this problem, we formulate the private consumption allocations in terms
of the social planner’s solution. Equation (4) implies that the ratio of marginal utilities
of two agents i and j must remain constant over time
ωj
ωi
=
u0(ci(t))
u0(cj(t))
=
u0(c∗i )
u0(c∗j )
where t ≥ 0 and c∗i denotes the steady state consumption of agent i. Assume w.l.o.g
that ci(0) > cj(0). Consider now a regressive transfer from j to i at t = 0. According
to Lemma 1 and 2, steady state consumption of i must be higher and steady state
consumption of j must be lower than before, since consumption is monotone in wealth
and aggregate consumption is constant in steady state independent of the distribution.
Hence, d
h
c∗i + c
∗
j
i
= 0 (assume for ease of notation i and j have the same weight in
the population). Using the implicit function theorem, we may calculate the implied
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change in welfare weights
∂ωi
∂c∗i
= −ωi
u00(c∗i )
u0(c∗i )
> 0 and
∂ωj
∂c∗i
= ωj
u00(c∗j )
u0(c∗j )
< 0.
We determine the change in consumption at date t ≥ 0. Applying the chain rule yields
∂ci(t)
∂c∗i
=
∂ci(t)
∂ωi
∂ωi
∂c∗i
=
u0(ci(t))
u00(ci(t))
u00(c∗i )
u0(c∗i )
,
analoguous for ∂cj(t)/∂c∗i . This allows us to determine the change in total consumption
∂ [ci(t) + cj(t)]
∂c∗i
=
u0(ci(t))
u00(ci(t))
u00(c∗i )
u0(c∗i )
− u
0(cj(t))
u00(cj(t))
u00(c∗j )
u0(c∗j )
.
This expression is negative iff
u0(ci(t))
u00(ci(t))
u00(c∗i )
u0(c∗i )
<
u0(cj(t))
u00(cj(t))
u00(c∗j )
u0(c∗j )
or
φ(ci(t))
φ(c∗i )
<
φ(cj(t))
φ(c∗j )
.
From the proof of Lemma 3 we know that this is equivalent to ∂c∗i /∂ci(t) > ∂c
∗
j/∂cj(t),
which holds true if ci(t) > cj(t) and φ is convex.
As a corollary note that −u0(c)/u00(c) being concave would imply that more unequal
societies save less. In addition, note that the results reverse if we consider a shrinking
economy where r(t) < ρ and hence c(t) < c(0), see the proof of Lemma 3. Finally,
savings are independent of distribution when −u0(c)/u00(c) is linear. Income distribu-
tion has no effect on accumulation when preferences take the HARA (hyperbolic risk
aversion) form (see the discussion in Bertola et al., 2006, chap. 3).
Furthermore, we are able to draw conclusions on the evolution of the consumption
and the wealth distribution.
Proposition 2 Consumption and wealth inequality increases (decreases) in a growing
economy if the elasticity of substitution −u0(c)/u00(c)c increases (decreases) in c.
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Proof. From (8) we see that the growth rate of individual consumption ċi/ci
increases in ci when −u0(c)/u00(c)c increases (decreases) in c. Wealth inequality moves
pari passu with consumption inequality since consumption is monotone in wealth.
Comparing Propositions 1 and 2, the conditions on the evolution of inequality are
not the same as for the concavity of the consumption function. The reason is the
following: The concavity of the consumption function follows from different marginal
propensities to consume. Instead, the evolution of the wealth and consumption in-
equality is governed by differences in saving or consumption rates, i.e. by different
average propensities to consume.
The difference between the two conditions can be best seen by considering an
example: Assume that the consumption function is linear but exhibits a positive axis
intercept due to subsistence consumption.6 In that case, the marginal propensities to
consume are the same, but the rich exhibit lower average propensity to consume. As
a result, inequality will widen over time.
2.3.3 Speed of convergence
We saw that all economies converge to the same steady state but unequal economies
grow faster in the transitional process. To bring these two results together we must
follow that more unequal societies exhibit a higher speed of convergence towards the
steady state. To calculate the speed of convergence K̇(t)/ (K(t)−K∗) we linearize the
economy around its steady state
Ċ(t)
C(t)− C∗
∼= K̇(t)
K(t)−K∗
∼= μ ≡ 1
2
"
ρ+
s
ρ2 + 4f 00(K∗)
Z
N
u0(c∗i )
u00(c∗i )
dPi
#
. (10)
6An example for a utility function giving rise to an affine linear consumption function is the Stone-
Geary utility u(c) = ln(c − c̄). Intuitively, the subsistence consumption level c̄ > 0 forces a poor
individual to start off with a high level of consumption in a growing economy which precludes them
from capital accumulation. Consequently, the subsequent growth rate of wealth and consumption is
lower for the poor.
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The derivation of equation (10) is shown in the appendix. The following proposition
proves our intuition.
Proposition 3 More unequal societies exhibit a higher speed of convergence.
Proof. As (10) is evaluated at the steady state, an increase in wealth dispersion
increases consumption dispersion. Hence, when −u0(c)/u00(c) is convex,
R
N −
u0(c∗i )
u00(c∗i )
dPi
is larger, this increases the absolute value of μ.
Along the same lines, we get the expressions for the evolution of aggregate con-
sumption and capital stock around the steady state
C(t)−C∗
C∗
∼=
Z
N
− u
0(c∗i )
u00(c∗i )c
∗
i
c∗i
C∗
dPi
f 00(K∗)
μ
eμt
K(0)−K∗
K∗
K(t)−K∗
K∗
∼= eμtK(0)−K
∗
K∗
.
These results highlight a further difference from the Bourguignon-Solow model.
Bourguignon’s (1981) analysis of the Solow model with concave consumption (or convex
savings) suggests that the poor might indirectly gain from redistribution. He showed
that inegalitarian steady states may occur where the consumption of the rich and the
poor is higher than in an egalitarian steady state. More inequality raises savings and
investment and therefore wages as the economy produces more capital intensive. This
mechanism is the reason why the consumption levels of the poor and the rich are higher
in the inegalitarian steady state than in the egalitarian one. Hence, the inegalitarian
steady state is Pareto-dominant. (Of course such a comparison is not possible because
there are no utility functions in the Solow model and the transitional process would
have to be taken into account).
In the Ramsey model with perfect and complete markets, the equilibrium allocation
is always Pareto optimal. Bourguignon’s result, however, appears when the utility level
of a single agent is examined. Consider a growing economy that undergoes a mean-
preserving spread in its wealth distribution. This raises the welfare of an agent i,
who is unaffected by the mean-preserving spread, because the more unequal economy
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grows faster in the transition process. Importantly, the Ramsey model does not have
a Pareto improvement because at least some of the agents whose wealth is taken in
the regressive transfer must be worse off.
The analysis on convergence was restricted to a neighborhood of the steady state.
In particular, the consumption inequality is evaluated at its steady state level. Hence,
the linearization does not allow for "feedback" effects of income distribution on growth
and vice versa. To study the dynamics outside of steady state we therefore have to
refer to numerical simulations; this is done in the next section 3.
3 Numerical exercise
To study the quantitative effects involved, we perform a simple quantitative exercise.
Let marginal utility be given by u0(c) = (cγ − 1)−σ where a consumption of unity
may be interpreted as the subsistence level and γ < 1. It is easy to show that the
resulting consumption function is concave in wealth when the interest rate exceeds the
rate of time preference. Furthermore, the elasticity of substitution −u0(c)/u00(c)c is
increasing in consumption. The preference parameters are chosen as ρ = 0.02, σ = 2,
and γ = 0.01. The new parameter γ determines the concavity of the consumption
function. The MPC will react more strongly to changes in wealth as γ increases. The
aggregate production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form, Y = Kα. The capital share
is given by α = 0.33. Hence the steady states values of capital and consumption are
given by K∗ = (α/ρ)1/(1−α) = 65.6 and C∗ = (K∗)α = 3.94.
To simplify further we assume that there are only two groups in the population: β
poor and 1−β rich agents. According to Wolff (1998), the top 20% of the US population
owns about 80% of financial wealth. To match the (financial) wealth distribution, let
β = 0.8 be the group size of the poor. I choose the following individual wealth levels at
date 0: kP (0) = 10 and kR(0) = 110. Therefore, with this specification, the richest 20%
own 73% of aggregate wealth. The aggregate capital stock is K(0) = 30, or around
14
45% of its steady state value. The only free parameter left is the distribution of wage
incomes (labor endowments). In the low inequality simulation I choose lP = 0.8 (a
poor individual earns 80% of the average wage income) whereas in the high inequality
case I set lP = 0.5.
Table 1, F igure 2
How well can this simple model with perfect markets account for differences in savings
rates? The difficulties in estimating cross country relationships between inequality and
savings rates notwithstanding, Smith (2001) estimated that an increase in the Gini
coefficient by one standard deviation or 10 percentage points is associated with a 1.5%
increase in the country’s savings rate. In Table 1 we see that, with the chosen values
of the parameters, an increase in the consumption Gini of 10 percentage points result
in a savings rate increase of 0.6 - 1 percentage points,7 with higher marginal effects for
higher levels of inequality. Although no elements of uncertainty are present, the model
is able to generate reasonable quantitative effects. Furthermore, the simulation shows
the evolution of inequality and, in particular, the influence of the higher savings rates
of the rich. The positive subsistence consumption c̄ = 1 forces the poor to choose a
flat consumption path (see Figure 2) which results in a slow accumulation of assets.
For the high inequality specification, the poor’s assets in steady state are even lower
than at the starting date (see Table 1, last column).
4 Conclusion
I analyzed the macroeconomic implications of decreasing marginal consumption propen-
sities. With optimal savings and infinite horizons, the equilibrium sequences of interest
7Note that we evaluate the savings rates at the starting point of the transition process. Obviously,
as the economy moves closer to the steady state, the savings rates decline and equal zero in steady
state.
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rates and wages are unique and Pareto-efficient. If consumption is a concave function
of wealth, more inequality leads to a higher speed of convergence. This holds true
although inequality affects accumulation in the transition path with a general util-
ity function u(c). These results stand in a sharp contrast to Bourguignon’s findings
when assuming exogenous concave consumption behavior. Intuitively, the extreme dif-
ferences in the outcomes are analogous to those resulting from a comparison of the
Ramsey and the OLG models. The Solow-Stiglitz model with exogenous savings can
be rationalized by an OLG economy with (warm glow) bequests. In the OLG models,
multiple steady states may emerge as new generations enter the economy and agents
have finite horizons. In this paper, horizons are infinite, which precludes multiple
equilibriums. However, this conjecture needs to be explored further.
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5 Appendix
To derive the speed of convergence, we take a first-order Taylor approximation around
the steady state (where f 0(K) = ρ). For the evolution of individual consumption (8)
we get
ċi ∼=
∂ċi
∂ci
[ci − c∗i ] +
∂ċi
∂K
[K −K∗]
= −f 00(K) u
0(ci)
u00(ci)
[K −K∗] .
By aggregation we get the evolution of aggregate consumption (note that
·
C =
·
C − C∗)
·
C − C∗ ∼= f 00(K)
Z
N
− u
0(ci)
u00(ci)
dPi [K −K∗] . (A1)
In the same way we approximate the capital accumulation equation K̇ = f(K)− C,
·
K −K∗ ∼= ρ [K −K∗]− [C − C∗] . (A2)
As (A1) and (A2) are linear in C and K, the growth rates of [C − C∗] and [K −K∗]
coincide. The solution of this log linearized system is (10).
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Table 1: Calibration 
 
 High inequality Low inequality Representative 
Agent 
Initial values    
Labor endowment lP 0.5 0.8 1 
Asset endowment kP(0) 10 10 30 
Asset endowment kR(0) 110 110 30 
    
Consumption of the poor cP(0) 1.367 1.912 2.652 
Consumption of the rich cR(0) 7.320 5.430 2.652 
Aggregate consumption C(0) 2.557 2.615 2.652 
Consumption GINI 37.2 21.5 0 
Savings rate 16.8% 14.9% 13.7% 
    
Steady State    
Consumption of the poor cP* 1.512 2.421 3.940 
Consumption of the rich cR* 13.799 10.018 3.940 
Aggregate consumption C* 3.940 3.940 3.940 
Assets of the poor kP* 9.70 16.16 64.74 
Assets of the rich kR* 289.38 263.44 64.74 
 
Figure 1: Phase Diagram 
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Figure 2: Dynamics of individual variables 
for low initial inequality 
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